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ABSTRACT 
The relationship between board characteristics and the performance of 10 listed banks in Ghana 
between 2016-2017 was critically examined through the use of an unbalanced panel data. A two-
staged analytical process was used in estimating the relationship. The theoretical outcome of this 
article confirmed an existence of a positive relationship between bank performance, board size and 
board composition. A significant relationship between large board size and the financial performance 
of banks was realized after the research. Again, banks with large board size were deemed to have 
good monitoring function compared with small board size. Large board of directors was also seen to 
perform better in terms of accountability as compared with small board size in a Ghana. However, it 
also came to fore that board diversity in terms of gender had no effect on the performance of banks 
in Ghana. Therefore, it is recommended that outside directors and large board size should be 
practiced in Ghana looking at the significant effect it has on the financial performance of banks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate disappointment among businesses across 
the globe has become profuse over the last few 
decades. As a result, serious attention is being sought 
in management across firms in the areas of 
information disclosure, the viability of boards, 
auditing, the independence of directors, internal 
control mechanisms and so on. Consequently, the 
Basel Committee responsible for banking regulation 
has opined the need to have a diagnostic look into the 
management or corporate governance of all financial 
institutions. Having a management structure made up 
of a senior management and board of director was a 
recommendation made by the Basel committee 
(Doláková, 2015). Levine (2005), laid credence to the 
committees’ resolve that a good corporate 
mechanism fosters an effective monitoring, an 
improved productivity, as well as having a complete 
financial framework not just for the financial sector, 
but an improvement of a given country’s economy in  
 
 
 
general. The setting up of roles and relationship that 
must exist between management structures and the 
ownership of any business entity for the betterment 
of all stakeholders involved, is the core aim of 
corporate governance (Russo & Perrini, 2010). This 
same structure determines the appointment 
procedures in any given business entity at all times. 
An Agency theory can be defined as the relationship 
that exists between a shareholder (principal) and a 
business executive (agent) (Jones, Felps, & Bigley, 
2007). The principal is an owner of a firm, whereas, 
the agent, is the individual(s) that is tasked to manage 
the day-to-day activities of a firm on behalf of the 
principal (shareholder). A principal-agent problem 
arises when both the agent and the principal have 
conflicting interests (Laffont & Martimort, 2009). 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the USA suggested the 
increase in transparency to reduce agency conflict. 
As a matter of fact, transparency, is one of the 
several requirements under the of SOX Act (Chiang 
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& He, 2010). Goh and Rasli (2014) posited the 
presence of an independent board to ameliorate 
conflicts between an agent and a principal. 
Though board of directors performs various roles in 
financial firms, the most significant of them is their 
monitoring and controlling function, and the 
formulation of business strategies (Carter, D'Souza, 
Simkins, & Simpson, 2010). Means (2017) stated 
that the management of shareholders wealth and 
interest is the most important job of boards. Boards 
of directors are responsible for formulating business 
plans, setting corporate objectives, managing 
business activities, monitoring and evaluating and 
finally, seeing to the efficient implementation of 
corporate agenda (Wheelen & Hunger, 2011). Boards 
are again responsible for the appointment of senior 
managers, providing supervisory roles, planning 
remuneration packages, monitoring as well as 
influencing the total business strategy of firms 
(Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010). Due to the 
broad responsibilities and risks associated with banks 
and their regulations, boards in financial institutions 
tend to undertake much more significant roles as 
compared with boards in non-financial firms 
(Mehran, Morrison, & Shapiro, 2011). A major risk 
associated with banks is them becoming insolvent 
and this will lead to liquidation (Wagner, 2010). 
Shareholders and customers alike, lose their equity 
when banks become insolvent (Macey & O'hara, 
2003). The provision or creating of an informed 
understanding of corporate governance works and 
also how different boards perform in the Ghanaian 
banking sector will be the contribution of this 
research. The age of boards, the independence of 
directors, the size of boards and finally the gender of 
board members is what this research work will be 
looking at. Measuring the performance of banks is 
very critical to the bank’s existence and survival. It is 
upon the measurement of these banks that equity 
shareholders can get to know whether their 
investments are doing well or not, and also to 
determine their returns. Return on Equity (ROE) will 
be used in this study in measuring the performance of 
banks.  
RELATED STUDIES 
The Independent Directors and Performance 
A major challenge encountered by all forms of 
business entities is the composition of its board 
(Neubauer & Lank, 2016). Boards are formed for 
several strategic reasons depending on the type of the 
environment a business finds itself in (Freeman, 
2010). Due to this and many other reasons, it’s very 
important for researchers to know or identify the 
impact that these board members do have on banks 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 2001). (Adams et al., 2010; 
Drucker, 2012) have all agreed that a high number of 
board members who happens to be person outside the 
directors of a firm tends to be productive in their 
performance. Thailand and Turkish banks have been 
found to have a positive relationship with 
performance as a result of the independence of their 
board members and the firm as a whole (Khan, 
Muttakin, & Siddiqui, 2013). Non-executive board 
members have effective control over management 
and bank performance as a result of their 
independence and this inures to all stakeholders. 
The theory of agency, posits that, outside directors 
can only have the needed impact on organizational 
management if they remain independent in their 
decision making. Currently, governments, 
researchers and academicians alike have taken keen 
interest in the composition of boards due to their 
impact on total performance of banks. The vigilance 
of outside directors in the area of management helps 
to enhance the performance of banks. However, the 
works of Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) and 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) found no 
relationship between bank performance and board 
composition. Below is the hypothesis:  
    
 H1a: There is a significant relationship between high 
presence of external directors on boards and the financial 
performance of banks.  
 
 H1b: There is a significant relationship between high 
presence of institutional investors on boards and the 
financial performance of banks. 
 
Board Size and Performance  
A board is composed of all persons with voting rights 
tasked with the responsibility of making strategic 
decisions on behalf of any given business entity 
(Freeman, 2010). Members of a board are not just 
tasked with maintaining the equity of shareholders 
but also, to ensure that all administrative mechanisms 
work as expected so as to control or manage agency 
problems (Liu & Lu, 2007). Different scholars have 
different opinions on the performances of boards 
when it comes to board size and the performance of 
banks (Giovannini, 2010; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013). 
Bennington (2010) posited that an increase in the size 
of a board also brings about a commensurate increase 
in communication and coordination challenges 
among board members, thus, the increase in size 
brings about a challenge in monitoring. Normally, 
huge board sizes do have difficulty in calling regular 
meetings due to the non-availability of members and 
also the inability to have a quorum even when they 
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are present (Pearson, Seyfang, & Jenkins, 2013). 
Zahra, Filatotchev, and Wright (2009) stated that, 
other difficulty of an increased board size is the slow 
pace associated with decision making, which 
sometimes even prevents firms from taking 
advantage of business opportunities when it arrives. 
One other deficiency associated with large board size 
share by Yin (2011), is the peculiar challenges 
associated with calling for emergency meetings under 
certain situations.  
However, small boards do have the benefit of an 
enhanced monitoring by management  (Wincent, 
Anokhin, & Boter, 2009). In the works of  
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006), they posited 
that a board that is made up of more than eight (8) 
persons has a negative effect on the performance of 
CEOs, that is, they found no positive impact of large 
boards on the performance of banks. Also, Means 
(2017) found the inability of some members of 
boards to express themselves on issues of importance 
due to the fact that the board size were more than ten 
(10) people. Big boards can also lead to job loss for 
some employees, loss of money by stakeholders, due 
to monies used in maintaining these board members. 
A study undertaken in USA, Canada, France, Italy, 
Spain and UK on commercial banks between the 
period 1995 - 2005 on board size showed an inverted 
U-shape relationship with performance (Chao & 
Kumar, 2010). The Agency theory also associates 
value with large board size since it prevents CEOs 
from dominating banks, thereby increasing 
performance. Looking at how the inconsistencies 
associated with board size and bank performance by 
various researchers, the researcher presumes that, 
large boards do have a positive relationship with 
performance.  
Consequently, the hypothesis testing can be found 
below:  
H2: There is a significant relationship between the 
size of the board and the financial performance of 
banks. 
 
Gender Composition of Board and 
Performance 
Though there has been an increase in the number of 
women taking to managerial jobs, the ratio of women 
directors is very low even in developed economies 
(Boserup, Tan, & Toulmin, 2013). A census 
undertaken in 2008 by an Australian firm by name 
Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace in 
Australia, UK and the USA, showed a percentage of 
ratio of 10.7 for Australia, 12.2 and 15.4 respectively 
U.K and USA (EOWA, 2008).  Different researchers 
have diverse opinions on the association between 
banks competitive performance and gender diversity 
(Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010). Good cognitive style 
of women enables them to focus on harmony, and as 
well as being able to communicate outcomes 
effectively even in the face of adversity (Robinson, 
2016). The apparent non- involvement of female 
representation on boards could be due to the lack of 
women with top credentials, discrimination or even 
both (Seierstad, 2016). Diverse teams perform better 
than homogeneous teams (Hoogendoorn, Oosterbeek, 
& Van Praag, 2013). A problem-solving capacity, 
innovation and the know-how to manage banks is an 
attribute associated with board diversity (DuBrin, 
2015). Hale (2012) showed how diversified boards 
presents multiple outlook in challenge solving in 
banks. The more diversified a board is, the more 
unique the members become and the more their value 
also becomes, thereby improving their effectiveness 
on the total performance of banks in the long run 
(Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008). The works of  
Dezsö and Ross (2012) showed that female board 
members fosters stock price information through an 
increased public disclosure ( This result was due to 
either a female board member being made part of 
board directors based on company regulations). 
Other benefits associated with female board members 
are their communication skills, personality, career 
expertise, experience and good educational 
background (Bear et al., 2010). Kaner (2014) 
revealed that female board members do not only 
make important decisions, but also, good at 
brainstorming. Also, Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 
(2009) stated that female board directors are usually 
lees power inclined, rather, they are much more 
compassionate than male directors. Further works by 
Adams and Ferreira (2009)  and Anderson, Reeb, 
Upadhyay, and Zhao (2011) showed that having a 
female board director brings about a diversified 
decision-making process and monitoring. Again, 
female directors are also known for attending 
meetings more than their fellow male directors, 
thereby increasing their monitoring and decision-
making function (Grant, 2016). Regular attendance 
of meetings also shows how hard working and 
committed female directors can be (Grant, 2016). 
Miller and del Carmen Triana (2009) also founded a 
positive relationship between bank performance and 
having female board members. Though, there are 
several literatures to show the positive relationship 
between female directors and banks performance, 
there are also works that depict a rather conflicting 
outcome (Fauzi & Locke, 2012). Carter et al. (2010) 
and Terjesen, Couto, and Francisco (2016) showed a 
negative relationship between bank performance and 
female directors.  Pathan and Faff (2013) showed a 
non-significant connection between banks 
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performance and female directors.  According to the 
Agency Theory, the works of boards are much more 
effective when they have diverse members and 
independent (Bear et al., 2010). His work also 
showed a positive relation between performance of 
banks and female board members. The SOX act of 
the USA, also proved the same positive tendency 
(Wheelen, Hunger, Hoffman, & Bamford, 2017). As 
a result, the hypothesis for the test is stated as: 
  
H3: There is a significant relationship between high 
presence of female directors on boards and the 
financial performance of banks. 
Control Variables  
The control variable is introduced so as to mediate 
the relationship between boards and banks financial 
performance. The size of any bank be it small or big 
has its own economic relevance because it has the 
ability to enhancing financial performance (Berger & 
Bouwman, 2013). Due to this, bank size will be used 
as a control variable by the researcher (Demirgüç-
Kunt & Maksimovic, 2002). Non-performing loans 
(NPL) will also be use as another control variable. 
NPL is also an important attribute that can be used in 
measuring the performance of a bank, as they are also 
known to have a positive impact on financial 
performance (Messai & Jouini, 2013). Capital 
Adequacy Ratio (CAR) becomes the third control 
variable to be used by this research because it also 
used in moderating bank performance and corporate 
governance (Tulung & Ramdani, 2016). The last 
control variable is Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It 
is also widely used as a control variable in researches 
associated with bank performance and corporate 
governance (Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). We 
thus postulate that; 
 H4a: There is a significant relationship 
between the size of a bank and the financial 
performance of banks. 
 H4b: There is a significant relationship 
between Non-performing loans (NPL) and 
the financial performance of banks. 
 H4c: There is a significant relationship 
between Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) and 
the financial performance of banks. 
 H4d: There is a significant relationship 
between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
the financial performance of banks. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Data and Model Design  
Board characteristics used in this research is namely, 
board size (BODS), board gender (BODG) and board 
composition (BODC). Return-On Equity (ROE) will 
be used in measuring this work. ROE is defined as 
the total income returned as a percentage of 
shareholders’ fund. Just as Mashayekhi and Bazaz 
(2008) used ROE in measuring board composition, 
the researcher will do same with this work. Board 
size can be explained as the group of individuals 
appointed to represent the interest of shareholders 
(Arosa, Iturralde, & Maseda, 2010). Nielsen and 
Huse (2010) defined board gender as the ratio of men 
and women who represent positions on a board.  A 
loan that is in default or the inability of a borrower to 
pay either the interest on a loan or the loan itself is 
termed as a Non-performing loan (Addae-Korankye, 
2014). Capital adequacy ratio is calculated as the 
overall capital to total weighted assets (Cohen & 
Scatigna, 2016). Out of annual financial reports of 
the banks, an unbalanced panel data will be used in 
measuring all the 16 banks in Ghana between the 
period 2002– 2017. The use of panel data in the data 
analysis of this research allows the reduction in data 
estimation biases to some extent, as well as reducing 
the challenges of multicollinearity (Hsiao, 2014). It 
also gives a time-variant association when 
investigating the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables (Hsiao, 2014). 
 
Analytical Model 
We performed a two-staged analytical process to 
obtain the results of this study. This involved 
establishing co-integration among the variables and 
establishing causality among the variables. The study 
employs the dynamic ordinary least square regression 
to estimate the relationship between the independent 
variables and the dependent variables. In the dynamic 
ordinary least square regression model, the co-
integration regression is augmented with lags and 
leads to ensure that the resulting co-integration 
regression is orthogonal to the entire history of the 
stochastic regressor innovations. We first determined 
the appropriateness of the data for long run co-
integration using the ARDL bound testing method 
prescribed by Pesaran (as cited in (Al-Malkawi, 
Marashdeh, & Abdullah, 2012). This model is 
preferred to others since it accommodates (efficient 
and consistent) every type and quantity of data. 
Moreover, our proffered co-integrated test (the 
ARDL bound test) does mandate first order 
integration of all the variables. Finally the ARDL 
bound test is preferred as it ignores the need for I (0) 
or I (I), mutual or fractional co-integration of the 
variables.  The ARDL estimator used in our study is 
mathematically expressed as follows: 
Volume 9 | Issue 1 | January-December-2018 [(9)1: 892-902] | http://onlinejournal.org.uk/index.php/BJIR/index  
          + 
1
k
i
             +
1
k
i
              + 
1
k
i
  
           + 
1
k
i
              + 
1
k
i
            +    
1
k
i
  
                     +                                               (1)        
Causality among the Variables 
Following an earlier work of causality estimation by 
Hacker & Hatemi-J, 2006; Ko & Ogaki, 2015), the 
Bootstrap Granger Causality, was used to generate 
the simulated data, the Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) was initially estimated as follows: 
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This (1 − L), the lag operator, denotes the number of 
lags in the model; and the        denotes the error 
correction term. We then estimated the test statistics 
 ̂  by as shown in the equation below. 
 ̂    (   |   |- In|   |      
Where      and     are the residual covariance 
matrices under the Granger causality hypothesis. 
Our study repeats this step 10,000times, to obtain 
10,000 bootstrapped samples. Subsequently, our 
study re-estimated the coefficients in the VECM 
model (9) for each of the bootstrapped sample. We 
further constructed their corresponding test statistics 
   as in the first step as shown in equation below. 
 ̂    (   |   |- In|   |         
Finally, we used the 10,000 test statistics  ̂    
obtained from the bootstrapped replications in the 
third step to construct the empirical distribution and 
as well as to specify the new p-value (bootstrapped 
p-value)  
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
Source: Annual reports of the commercial local 
banks (for the Board characteristics and bank specific 
control variables) and World Bank indicators (for 
GDP growth).  
  
Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics on the 
board structure, the performance measure (ROE) and 
the control variables for the sample banks for the 
period 2002–2017. Average of board composition is 
31% and with a minimum of 11% and maximum of 
68%. Average board size was approximately 6 with a 
minimum of 5 and a maximum of 9. The board 
gender ranged from a minimum of 0.01 to a 
maximum of 0.8 with an average of 0.43.  
 
Unit Root Test 
Table 1 shows the analysis of the unit root test. This 
is tested using the ADF and the PP test as well as the 
KPSS Unit Root Test. The results as reported 
indicate that all the Variables are non-stationary in 
their levels but they become stationary after the first 
differencing. Thus the ADF and the PP TEST 
suggest that the null hypothesis that the time series 
are integrated at first order cannot be rejected at the 5% 
significant level in the case of each variable. This is 
also the F-statistics values are greater than the critical 
values at 5% critical level. The results of the KPSS 
Unit Root Test are not significantly different from 
the others. Together it is concluded that the series are 
stationary at level. At first difference analysis, all the 
t-statistic values are less than variables are not 
stationary at level but become stationary at first 
difference.  
 
The ADF, PPP and KPSS regressions include an 
intercept and trend. Optimal lags are determined 
using the Akaike Information Criterion. ADF and PP 
tests represents non-stationarity test whilst the KPSS 
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represents the stationarity test. Each critical value is 
at 5% significant level. 
 
  CO-Integration Analysis 
 
We use critical bounds from Pesaran et al. (2001) to 
make decision either co-integration exists or not. 
Intercept and but no trend are used. AIC was used to 
select the optimum lag length for diagnostic tests. 
The next level of analysis involved the ARDL model 
test as prescribed by Pesaran et al. to test and 
establish whether there is a long and short run 
relationship of the time series data. The results of the 
ARDL model bound test for the co-integration shows 
that where ROE is the dependent variable other 
variables (Board Composition, Board Size, Board 
Gender, Bank Size, Non-Performing Loan, capital 
adequacy ratio, gross domestic product growth) are 
independent of the,? F-statistic values are greater 
than the upper bound value of 8.27 at 2.5% 
significant level. However, at 1% significant level, 
our F-statistic fall in-between the lower and upper 
bounds.  Thus we reject the assumption that there is 
no co-integration. This invariably implies that at 2.5% 
significant level, Board Composition, Board Size, 
Board Gender, Bank Size, Non-Performing Loan, 
capital adequacy ratio, gross domestic product 
growth are co-integrated with ROE. Similarly, when 
we run model 2 with ROE as dependent variable and 
Board Composition, Board Size, Board Gender, 
Bank Size, Non-Performing Loan, capital adequacy 
ratio, gross domestic product growth as independent 
variable, the F-statistic figures are higher than the 
upper bound value of 5.61 at 1% significant level. 
This result is interpreted that, at 1% significance 
level, the null hypothesis of no co-integration is 
rejected and it is concluded that there is co-
integration relationship between ROE and 
Independent Directors, Board Size, Board Gender, 
Bank Size, Non-Performing Loan, capital adequacy 
ratio, gross domestic product growth.  The validity of 
the above model was tested using the Breusch-
Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test and Breusch-
Pagan-Godfrey Heteroskedasticity Test diagnostic 
Tests. From the two tests, the results of the calculated 
F-statistic value p-values,  we accept the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
 
Table 4: Long and Short Run Analysis 
                                                                                       
After establishing co-integration, the long and short 
run impact of independent directors, Board Size, 
Board Gender, Bank Size, Non-Performing Loan, 
capital adequacy ratio, gross domestic product 
growth on ROE is explored. The information is 
presented in table 4. The results show a positive and 
significant relationship for each of the independent 
variables on return on equity and this supports 
existing literature. Invariably, the analysis indicates 
that independent directors (ratio of non-executive 
directors) is significantly associated with the 
performance of banks, which means that an increased 
in the non-executive directors of a bank will increase 
its performance. The outcome supports the agency 
theory, which posits that a board with a high number 
of outside director results in an effective firm 
performance. This result is consistent with (Tian, 
Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, 2011).  
The outcome of the hypotheses showed a positive 
association between independent directors and 
performance of the bank. The illustration above also 
shows that bank performance has a significant 
relationship with the board size. The output also 
confirms the works of (Belkhir, 2009). Further, the 
results showed that women directors on board lead to 
lower bank performance in Ghana. This finding is 
consistent with the woks of (Galal, 2017) in Egypt 
but it’s in contradiction to the works of SPINA (2014) 
for banks in Italy. However, the hypothesis H3 
cannot be accepted per the findings above which 
portray an insignificant relationship between female 
directors and bank performance. There are diverse 
reasons for the negative relationship for the outcome. 
A diverse board might have challenges during 
meetings and decision making. Different view point, 
varied state of mind and distinctive styles can be a 
source of worry and ruin cohesion at meetings 
(Freeman, 2010). Such subtle negative tendencies 
can greatly impact on the effectiveness of focused 
group deliberations (Freeman, 2010). Harrison, Price, 
Gavin, and Florey (2002) acknowledged the cost 
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associated with analyzing distinctive perspective and 
identifying contradictions is another challenge with 
gender diversity. It is noted that the board diversity 
may expand the likelihood of ambiguities, false 
impressions, and decision mistakes (Randøy et al., 
2006). Further, findings show that the percentage of 
non-performing loan has a significant negative 
influence on performance as measured by ROE, 
which is according to the notion that non-performing 
loan in the financial sector increases the possibility to 
lead establishment to difficulty and worse bank 
performance (Messai and Jouini, 2013). Nonetheless, 
GDP growth has a significant positive influence on 
banks financial performance. However, bank size and 
capital adequacy ratio does not have significant 
impact on banks financial performance. In sum, the 
findings indicate that practices of governance in 
Ghanaian banks are good, including board 
characteristics (the number of directors, independent 
directors, and gender of the board). These variables 
are significantly linked with banks’ performance 
across financial measures such as Return on Equity.  
Conclusion  
 The principles of agency theory were used as 
fundamentals of this work. To measure the desired 
corporate governance characteristics of interest 
against performance, we used unbalanced pooled of 
16 banks in Ghana over a period of fifteen years from 
2002-2017 into a panel data. A significant 
relationship between large board size and the 
financial performance of banks was realized after the 
research, again, banks with large board size were 
deemed to have good monitoring function compared 
with small board size. Large board of directors was 
also seen to perform better in terms of accountability 
as compared with small board size in a Ghana. 
However, it also came to fore that board diversity in 
terms of gender had no effect on the performance of 
banks in Ghana. Therefore, it is recommended that 
outside directors and large board size should be 
practiced in Ghana looking at the significant effect it 
has on the financial performance of banks. Again, 
other sectors of the Ghanaian economy such as the 
manufacturing and processing factories, the 
agricultural industry, the extractive industry as well 
as the tourism sector and many others were not 
involved. Though the research had limitations, it’s 
believed that looking at how the financial sector has 
become very pivotal to the development of Ghana 
and Africa as a whole, the positive feedbacks out of 
this work will be very vital to not only investors but 
to all players in the financial sector across the world. 
Future works are encouraged in the limited areas of 
this work to enhance literature on banks and financial 
performance. Though there has been an increase in 
the number of women taking to managerial jobs, the 
ratio of women directors is very low even in 
developed economies (Powell, 2018). A census 
undertaken in 2008 by an Australian firm by name 
Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace in 
Australia, UK and the USA, showed a percentage of 
ratio of 10.7 for Australia, 12.2 and 15.4 respectively 
U.K and USA  (Strachan, 2010).  Different 
researchers have diverse opinions on the association 
between banks competitive performance and gender 
diversity (Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2013). 
Good cognitive style of women enables them to 
focus on harmony, and as well as being able to 
communicate information effectively even in the face 
of adversity (Banda, 2018).  
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